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THE SHIFTING OF TORT LOSS IN MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
CHE mR JAmEs ANEATj*
INTRODUCTION

T HIS article treats of the cases and statutes involving municipal corporations
which have combined in some way with other tort-feasors to injure third
persons. The municipal corporation and the companion wrong-doer will be
referred to, whenever possible, as co-tort-feasors. The myriad and confused
definitions of writers and courts prevent the wholesome use of the term
"joint tort-feasors." Some writers have suggested that this term is applicable
only to the parties who purposely act in concert to produce an injury.1 Such
an intentional delict is seldom found in municipal corporation law and if
this were the usual definition there would be few municipal "joint tort-feasors."
Furthermore, American courts are readily inclined to label municipalities and
their fellow delictuals as "joint tort-feasors" when their coincident culpability
is negligent and not intentional. Illustratively, where a municipal corporation
and another governmental unit operated a hospital where negligence injured a
patient, the court denominated the defendants as joint tort-feasors. 2 Again,
where two counties owned a defective bridge and through lack of care a user
was injured, the owners were labelled joint tort-feasors. 3 On the other hand,
some of the cases to be discussed refuse to describe the municipality and its
fellow wrong-doer as joint tort-feasors. 4 Thus, though a city had been held liable
to an injured person using the city walks, the Washington Court, in giving
indemnity to the city against the owner of abutting land who maintained the
dangerous trap-door in the sidewalk, stated that the city "would not be a
joint tort-feasor with the defendant, because the acts of negligence are the
wrongful acts of the defendant alone." 5 In another municipal corporation
case, the Georgia Court remarked: " .

.

. there was nothing whatever to show

any concert of action between the two in the wrong which caused Mrs. S's
injuries, such as is necessary to constitute them joint tort-feasors."0l In a
similar case the Michigan Court explained: "The parties were not joint tortfeasors. There was a separate duty imposed upon both with respect to the
same thing, but it was a separate duty imposed on each, and not joint.
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Author, Antieau on Municipal Corporations (3 vols) ; Seasongood Cases on Municipal Corporations (Antieau ed.). The assistance
of Mr. William Sayad of the class of 1961, Georgetown Law Center, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Davis, Indemnity between Negligent Tortfeasors, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 517, 537 (1952).
2. Smith v. City of Dallas, 78 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), reversed on other
grounds 107 S.W.2d 872 (T. Comm. App. 1935).
3. Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870).
4. City of Des Moines v. Barnes, 238 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W.2d 170 (1947); Hilyer v.
City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1951); City of Spokane v. Crane
Co., 98 Wash. 49, 167 P. 63 (1917).
5. Seattle v. Puget Sound Imp. Co., 47 Wash. 22, 91 P. 255, 257 (1907).
6. Schneider v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 610, 45 S.E. 459, 460 (1903).
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The neglect was likewise the separate neglect of each, and not the joint
neglect of both." 7 In denying contribution under the New York statute, the
New York court concluded a municipal corporation and the fellow wrong-doer
were not joint tort-feasors because they had breached their identical duties
to the same person in slightly different ways.8 It is clear that the term has
no consistent definition. The reasons for denominating persons "joint wrongdoers," as well as the reasons for refusing the label, are so variant and often
so unsound as to prevent significant analysis of the problem of shifting tort
loss around the term "joint tort-feasors." It will be more helpful to minimize
labels and endeavor to comprehend the circumstances in which tortious municipal corporations can recover from their co-tort-feasors and vice versa.
REcoVERY OVER By MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AGAINST THEIR
FEASORS (1) IN INDEMNITY

Co-ToRT-

There are many situations in American municipal corporation law where
tort-feasing municipalities are able to recover from their co-tort-feasors in
indemnity. In some of these instances the recovery is posited upon the terms
of an express contract. Frequently, municipal corporations require that contractors working for them on the public streets, walks and buildings provide
in the contract to indemnify the former if the latter should by its negligence
impose a tort judgment upon the municipality. Often, too, municipalities
require comparable agreements from those who seek to tear up the public
streets and sidewalks for private construction or other advantage. 9 There are
additional cases in which courts have concluded that private parties had entered
into contracts implied in fact with the municipal corporation.' 0 Here, too, the
problem is one of contract law, although some of these have mistakenly been
adjudicated on restitutionary principles. The courts have indicated that the
consensual agreements of individuals with municipal corporations will not
in doubtful cases be construed to indemnify the municipal corporation against
losses resulting from its own negligence. Where such an intention is not expressed
in unequivocal terms, the uncertainty will be resolved against the municipality."
The major concern of this part of the paper is with municipal recovery
over against a co-tort-feasor when there is no contract expressed or implied in
fact. American courts have regularly given indemnity on quasi-contract or
restitutionary principles to municipal corporations when they have had to pay
tort judgments that in justice should have been borne by the other wrong-doer.
Thus, in a very typical case, where an abutting owner rendered a sidewalk
dangerous and failed to guard it, a tort judgment resulting against the
7. City of Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 37 N.W. 882, 886 (1888).
8. West v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 524, 12 N.E.2d 458 (1937); Semble: Franzen
v. Dimock Gould & Co., - Iowa -, 101 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1960).
9. Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. Super 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).
10. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896); City of
Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan 369, 252 P. 268 (1927).
11. Longi v. Raymond-Commerce Corp., 34 N.J. Super 593, 113 A.2d 69 (1955).
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municipality, the latter was given indemnity against the property owner, "It
is well settled," observed the New York Court, "that a municipal corporation
which has been compelled to pay a judgment recovered against it for damages
sustained by an individual through an obstruction, defect or excavation in the
sidewalk or street of such corporation, has an action over against the person
12
who negligently or unlawfully created the defect which causes the injury."
There are literally dozens of cases to the effect that where an adjoining property
owner negligently renders the sidewalk more dangerous a municipal corporation
subjected to a tort liability can secure indemnity from the wrong-doer abutter.13
And there are many cases giving municipal corporations indemnity against
contractors, abutting owners and others who have rendered the public streets
unsafe for travel and imposed tort judgments upon the municipalities. 14 There
is also a group of miscellaneous situations in which municipal indemnity was
considered proper on "restitutionary grounds. 15 Clearly, the basis for recovery
in all these cases is unjust enrichment under traditional quasi-contract theory.
Thus, Woodward wrote of these cases: "The obligation may well be rested
upon quasi-contractual principles, for insofar as one tort-feasor pays what in
equity and good conscience another tort-feasor ought to pay, the latter receives
a benefit at the expense of the former, the retention of which is unjust."',;
In order to justify restitutionary indemnity where the municipality shifts
the entire tort loss over to the co-tort-feasor there should b no culpability in the
12. Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat'l. Bank, 96 N.Y. 550, 555 (184).
13. "Where an adjoining property owner for the exclusive benefit of his own property
places in a public street or sidewalk some artificial structure and a city is compelled to pay
compensation in damages to a member of the public injured thereby the city has a right
to recover the amount so paid from the property owner by way of indemnity." City &
County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d S02, SOS
(195S). So, also; Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 712
(fis6); Great A & P Tea Co. v. Boyles, 102 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1939); City of Des Moines
Barnes, 233 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W. 882 (1947) ; City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Water
Co.. 1.3 Iowa 24, 175 N.W. 821 (1920) ; City of Ft. Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan.
369, 252 P. 26S (1927); Lowell v. Boston and*Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839) ;
CiTy of Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 37 N.W. 882 (1888); Lobello v. City of New York,
24S App. Div. 880, 51 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1944), aff'd 294 N.Y. 816, 62 N.E.2d 243 (1945);
Trustees of Village of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N.Y. 354, 50 N.E. 971 (1898) ; Bowman
v. City of Greensboro, 190 N.C. 611, 130 S.E. 502 (1925) ; Mathews v. City of Pittsburgh,
394 Pa. 150, 146 A.2d 294 (1958); Ashley Borough v. Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 A. 442
(i911) ; Golden v. City of Philadelphia, 162 Pa. Super 247, 57 A.2d 429 (1948) ; Salt Lake
City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149 (1945); City of Spokane v Crane Co. 98
Wash. 49, 167 P. 63 (1917).
14. City of Ottumwa v. Parks, 43 Iowa 119 (1876); City of Rochester v. Montgomery,
72 N.Y. 65 (1878).
15. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. County Comrs., 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930 (1910) (railroad rendering approach to bridge dangerous held to indemnify county); Hart Tp. v.
.oret, 191 Mich. 427, 158 N.W. 17 (1916) (defendant who constructed defective bridge
railinzs held to indemnify township); San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S.W. 1109
(1500) (city held liable for pollution of water could have indemnity against its tenants
who were responsible).
16. Woodward, Quasi Contracts 409 (1913). The occasional reference of the New
fork and Ohio courts to "subrogation" is unfortunate. City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123
X.Y. 405, 25 N.E. 937, 939 (1890); Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24
N.E.2d 708 (1940).
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city and full fault exclusively in the indemnitor. This is seldom demanded by
the courts in the cases under study. Although there has been a breach of
duty by a municipal corporation sufficient to have justified a tort judgment
against it in favor of the injured person, courts regularly give indemnity
to the municipal corporation if its co-tort-feasor was simply more culpable and
more responsible for the injury or damage. In an oft-cited Massachusetts case
that Court stated:
"If the parties are not equally criminal, the principal delinquent may
be held responsible to his co-delinquent for damages incurred by
their joint defense. In respect to offences, in which is involved
any moral delinquency or turpitude, all parties are deemed equally
guilty, and courts will not inquire into their relative guilt. But where
the offence is merely malum prohibitum, and is in no respect immoral,
it is not against the policy of the law to inquire into the relative
delinquency of the parties, and to administer justice between them,
although both parties are wrongdoers."' 7
This language has been utilized by the United States Supreme Court to justify
indemnity in favor of a municipal corporation. 18 Very similarly the New
York Court indicates: "Where the parties are not equally criminal, the
principal delinquent may be held responsible to a co-delinquent for damage
paid by reason of the offense in which both were concerned in different degrees
as perpetrators." 19 Quite apparent in some cases is the judicial feeling that
a municipal corporation violating a statutory duty to keep in repair all the
sidewalks and streets in the city is not so culpable as the property owner
who either created an obstruction or trap on the sidewalk in front of his
house or who permitted the walk to fall into disrepair. The courts have described
such co-tort-feasors as "the author of the nuisance,1 20 or "the actual and
22
only wrongdoers, ' 21 adding, "the landowner and lessee are more at fault."
The courts have, indeed, gone so far in the cases where both the homeowner
and the municipality at the same time breached similar duties to a pedestrian
to conclude that the delinquents were not joint tortfeasors. "The city and the
appellant were not in pari delicto," says the Washington Court; "they were not
joint tortfeasors." 23 Very similarly the courts view as more blameworthy a
contractor or others tearing up the streets. In giving the city indemnity the
courts characteristically refer to the co-tort-feasor as "the party immediately in
fault,"2 4 and again as "the primary and efficient cause"2 5 of the injury or
damage.
17. Lowell v. Boston and Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24, 32 (1839).
18. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 327-8 (1896).
19. Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 N.Y. 475, 487 (1872).

20. Salt Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149, 153 (1945).
21. Herron v. Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 200, 24 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1940).
22. Reinbach v. City and County of San Francisco, 164 Cal. App. 2d 763, 331 P.2d
1006, 1010 (1958).
23. City of Spokane v. Crane Co., 98 Wash. 49, 167 P. 63, 65 (1917).
24. Robbins v. Chicago, 71 U.S. 657, 670 (1877).
25. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C. 24, 70 S.E. 1070, 1074 (1911).
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In justifying indemnity to the municipal corporation tort-feasor, courts
at times have, as part of the fault differential approach, indicated that the
co-tort-feasor had greater control over the condition giving rise to the injury
than did the municipality.2 6 Often the courts have emphasized that the obstacle
27
in the sidewalk was there for the private benefit of the other wrong-doer.
A number of the cases justify indemnity to the municipal corporation by
stating that the city's duty and wrong are "only secondary" or "constructive,"
while the duty of the co-tort-feasor is "primary." Thus, the Michigan Court
remarks: " . .. the duty to construct or repair (a sidewalk) is primarily laid
upon the adjacent owner, . . . it is secondarily imposed upon . . . the municipality."2 Similarly, the Texas Court has said:
"It is well settled that under some states of fact two parties may be
liable to another for a tort, the one by construction of law, on account
of some omission of a duty of protection or care owed, and the other
because he is the active perpetrator of the wrong, and that in such
case the right of indemnity may exist in the one whose wrong was only
secondary." 2 9
Again, a New York court observes: "This right to recover over is based upon
the theory that the tort-feasors are not in pari delicto, the owner or lessee
being actually negligent and the municipality only constructively so." 30 This
kind of justification is but a crude and unfortunate way of explaining that
our notions of justice permit a tort-feasor to recover at least part of his loss
from a co-tort-feasor who is more negligent or more at fault for the injury
or damage. Further, one must question the verity of the statement that a
municipal corporation breaching its statutory duty to keep the walks in repair
after notice of the defect is "only constructively" at fault. The language
of "constructive" and "secondary" liability should be abandoned.
'Many of the courts in giving one tort-feasor indemnity against his fellow
wrong-doer couch their language in terms of "passive" versus "active" negligence. Here recovery over by the municipal corporation is justified because
its negligence was "only passive" whereas that of the co-tort-feasor was active."
The New York courts are especially responsible for this unfortunate and
meaningless indulgence in words that fall far short of an effective or worthy
26.

Des Moines v. Des Moines Water Co., 188 Iowa 24, 175 N.W. 821 (1920).

27. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896) ; Trustees
of Village of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N.Y. 354, 50 N.E. 971 (1898); Seattle v. Puget
Sound Improvement Co., 47 Wash. 22, 91 P. 255 (1907).
28. City of Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 37 N.W. 882, 884 (1888).
29. San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1900).
30. Bonadonna v. City of Buffalo, 156 Misc. 225, 226, 281 N.Y.S. 343, 344 (1935).
So, also: Great A & P Tea Co. v. Boyles, 102 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1939); Des Moines v.
Barnes, 238 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W.2d 170 (1947); Des Moines v. Des Moines Water Co., 188
Iowa 24, 175 N.W. 821 (1920); City of Ft. Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan. 369, 252
P. 268 (1927) ; Nicklesburg v. City of New York, 263 App. Div. 625, 34 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1942) ;
Hilyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1959); Philadelphia v.
Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183, 145 A. 65 (1929); San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S.W.

1109 (19oo).
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criterion. A New York court indicates that recovery over is there permissible
only where "the negligence of each defendant is separate and distinct, one
passive, the other active."131 The Washington Court, in giving indemnity to a
municipality, similarly states:
"But the person who actually created or maintained for his own use
the dangerous condition is, as between the city and himself, still
primarily liable on elementary principles, regardless of any statute
or charter provisions so declaring, simply because the dangerous
condition was the result of his own personal negligence. As between
him and the city, his3 was
the active negligence, while that of the city
2
was merely passive."1

At times, too, the negligence of the city is described as "only constructive", in
opposition to the "active" negligence of the co-tort-feasor.3 3 It seems rather
obvious that the Maryland Court does not deem very culpable the municipality's disregard of its statutory duty. Says this Court in granting indemnity:
"The plaintiff is held liable by inference of law, and not by reason of his
active participation in the act which was the occasion of the injury."3 4 It is
impossible to defend the "active-passive" theory of indemnity. The New
York Court has to admit: "It is frequently difficult to determine whether a
defendant's negligence has been active." 35 Candor compels a recognition that
there is no effective determinant in this dichotomy. Why should a municipality
be denied indemnity, regardless of comparative culpability, because both it
and the co-tort-feasor were "passively" negligent?36 Sins of omission are
frequently as blameworthy as those of commission, and the record engenders
great doubt that the municipal corporations given indemnity in the "activepassive" states such as New York were not "actively" culpable under a fair
interpretation of the word. The attempt is as unnecessary as it is unworkable.
All that is required is a frank recognition that a less-at-fault wrong-doer is
entitled to recover over at least part of his loss from his co-tort-feasor who is at
greater fault. Obviously, as is soon developed, all-or-nothing indemnity is not
the proper solution.
Some of the courts explain indemnity for the municipal tort-feasor by
emphasizing that the co-tort-feasor owed a duty, not only to the injured
person, but also to the municipal corporation. Illustratively, in giving indemnity
to a city tort-feasor a California court states: "the landowner and lessee are
more at fault, as they have violated duties toward the city as well as to the
users of the street."' ar Again, a Texas court indicates: "It is a question of
31. Weber v. City of New York, 18 Misc. 2d 590, 592, 186 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (1959).
32.

City of Spokane v. Crane Co, 98 Wash. 59, 167 P. 63, 64 (1917).

33. Lowell v. Boston and Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24, 32 (1839).
34. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. County Comrs., 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930, 934 (1910).
35. Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 456, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15, 22 (1959).
36. Cf. Philadelphia v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183, 145 A. 65 (1929); Bohlen, Contribution And Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 22 Cornell L.Q. 469, 479 (1937).
37. Reinach v. City and County of San Francisco, 164 Cal. App. 2d 763, 331 P.2d
1006, 1010 (1958).
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indemnity against one whose negligence was a proximate cause of the injury,
by one who had suffered as a result of such negligence, where the negligence
consisted of a duty owing by the one guilty of the negligence to the one who
suffered from it."' 38 And, in holding tenants to indemnify the municipal landlord when they were co-tort-feasors with the city, the Texas Court stated: "We
think it is also true that they did owe to the city a duty of refraining from
such interferences with the arrangements made by it for the disposition of the
sewage as would cause an injury which would not otherwise have happened;
and if they did so interfere, they would be bound to indemnify the city for
any loss thereby occasioned to it."'30 The courts which base recovery over
on a breach of duty to the city are approximating very closely a tort theory of
indemnification. Some of the early cases of indemnity proceeded on the theory
of trespass on the case.40 "Contributory negligence" in the municipal corporation is present in practically all the indemnity cases and it is no bar to
indemnification seen as an application of restitutionary principles. 41 Under
tort theory the plaintiff tort-feasor's negligence might well be an obstacle to
recovery by him. Seen as a quasi-contract problem the lesser culpability of
the plaintiff is acknowledged but properly deemed irrelevant.
There is a general principle of indemnification law that one held liable
in tort solely because of the wrong-doings of another is ordinarily to be given
recovery over against the actor. This principle applies to authorize municipal
recovery where its tort liability is solely vicarious. The Michigan Court has
said: "It must also be recognized as a general rule that where the wrongful act
of one results in liability being imposed on another, such other person may have
42
indemnity from the person actually guilty of the wrong."
That comparative culpability is the traditional clue to indemnity is
verified by the general rule denying indemnification to municipal corporations
when in pari delicto with their co-tort-feasor. 43 A New York court recently
remarked: "When two parties acting together, commit an illegal or wrongful
act, one cannot have judgment over against the other because both are equally
culpable or particepts criminis, or in pari delicto because the damage resulted
from their joint offense." ' 44 Courts have at times concluded that municipalities
were in pari delicto with the property owner and consequently denied indemnity when each violated his duty to keep in repair the walk. 45 Other courts
38.
39.
40.
41.

City of Corsicana v. Tobin, 57 S.W. 319, 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 272, 59 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1900).
Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839).
Sioux City v. Weare, 59 Iowa 95, 12 N.W. 786 (1882); Salt Lake City v. Schubach,

108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149 (1945).
42. Village of Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173 N.W. 382, 383 (1919).
43. Middleton v. City of Tacoma, 300 N.Y. 732, 92 N.E.2d 312 (1950); Mills v.

City of New York, 189 Misc. 291, 71 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1947); Trustees of Village of Geneva
v. Bush Elec. Co., 50 Hun 581, 3 N.Y.S. 595 (1889); Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505
(1911).
44. Weber v. City of New York, 18 Misc. 2d 590, 593, 186 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (1959).
45. Weber v. City of New York, 18 Misc. 2d 590, 186 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1959).
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have been inclined to apply the rule of pari delicto when both co-tort-feasors
were guilty of "active negligence". To illustrate, when a city knew of a
hole in a street and did not repair it, the court refused it indemnity, saying:
"But it is believed no case can be found wherein a recovery back has
been allowed if both wrongdoers were only passively negligent, or
where both wrong-doers were actively and affirmatively negligent.
To otherwise hold puts a premium on indolence or inefficiency of city
officers. In the case at bar the city had actual notice of the defect,
because it notified the asphalt company of such defect. The officers
of each trifled with the situation, trusting no one would be hurt, and
then each gambled with the proposition as to who would pay the
damages if a person did get hurt. There is46no equity in favor of either
of the wrongdoers as against the other."
Courts have denied indemnity to municipal corporations from their co-tortfeasors when the negligence of the city occurred later in point of time than that
of its fellow wrongdoer. Illustratively, where a municipal corporation knew a
feTtilizer company had breached its duty to clear the streets of a dead animal
and itself failed in its duty to clear the streets, the court characterized the
municipality's intervening negligence as the proximate cause of the injury
47
and denied recovery against the fertilizer company that had breached its duty.
These results are completely defensible on a comparative fault analysis. As
indicated by the "last clear chance doctrine," our law culture probably acknowledges that the person who later discovers the perilous condition and does
nothing to fulfill his duty is more "culpablethan the person who earlier breached
a similar duty to the same injured party.
By a general rule in indemnity law recovery over is denied to a wilful
or intentional tort-feasor and the rule presumably will be applied to a municipal
tort-feasor, although the case has not been found. Furthermore, in the states
applying the unfortunate "active-passive" theory of indemnity, recovery is
4
denied to a municipal corporation that has been actively negligent. S
There is an occasional suggestion that indemnity should be denied to
municipal corporations when they have breached a statutory duty. A New
York judge has said: "Whether there should be indemnity or contribution here,
in the absence of an unequivocal indemnity agreement, is to be determined by
whether the duty which was breached by the city was enjoined upon it by
46. City of Des Moines v. Barber Asphalt Co., 208 Fed. 828, 831 (S.D. Iowa 1913).
Note, also Village of Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173 N.W. 382 (1919)
(no indemnity where village and utility were both negligent in the care of their wires and
a boy was killed when wires fell).
47. Nashville v. Singer & Johnson Fert. Co., 127 Tenn. 107, 153 S.W. 838 (1913).
But cf. Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. 418 (1862).
48. 'Where the municipality itself creates a defect there can be no recovery over
for in such a case the municipality is the active tortfeasor." Golden v. City of Philadelphia,
162 Pa. Super 247, 57 A.2d 429, 430 (1948). So also: Bowling Green v. Bowling Green
Gas Lt. Co., - Ky. -, 112 S.W. 917 (1908); Steams v. Mt. Lebanon Tp., 167 Pa. Super
341, 74 A.2d 779 (1950).
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statute."419 There is no evidence that the suggestion is present law. Indeed,
the evidence seems to be that the courts are considering the fault of the
municipal corporation less than its co-tort-feasor in the sidewalk cases because
they feel the duty imposed by statute upon the cities to maintain their walks
in safe condition throughout the entire city is somewhat unreasonable and
unfair, whereas the duty imposed by law upon the owner to safeguard the
walk in front of his own place is much more reasonable.50
The clearest case where municipal corporations are unable to secure
indemnity after having paid a tort judgment is where the court concludes that
the present defendant owed no duty to the person injured. Illustratively, in
some states such as Ohio where the abutting owner has constructed a sidewalk
along his premises and a municipality has accepted it, the responsibility for
keeping the walk open, in repair and free from nuisance is not that of the
abutting owner but is the sole obligation of the city. Consequently, in these
jurisdictions, if a pedestrian is injured from a defective walk and recovers
in tort from the municipality the latter cannot secure indemnity against the
property owner on a theory that the latter was negligent in constructing the
walk or failing to maintain it. 5- And, at a time when in Iowa the landowner
had no duty until notice from the city to repair the sidewalk and he permitted
it to fall into disrepair, a municipal corporation held liable in tort was denied
2
indemnification since no duty of the owner to the pedestrian was neglected .5
Again, where an owner of property is not by local law liable to a pedestrian
injured for the former's failure to remove snow or ice in violation of a statute
or ordinance, a city held for tort damages to an injured pedestrian cannot
secure indemnity from the owner. 53 Customarily courts have interpreted
ordinances requiring the owner to keep his walks in repair and free of ice and
snow as not creating a duty to the pedestrian. There is not, however, any
reason in law why a clearly worded and unequivocal statute or ordinance
cannot place such a duty upon a property owner. The principle permeating all
these cases is to the effect that indemnity will not run by one who has paid a
tort judgment against another who would never have been liable directly when
sued by the injured party. Further illustrative of the same principle are the
cases holding that a municipal corporation is to be denied indemnity where the
party being sued is the employer of the injured person to whom the employer
has already made payments under an applicable workmen's compensation act
49. Carswell, J. dissenting in Lobello v. City of New York, 268 App. Div. 880,
51 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8, aff'd, 294 N.Y. 816, 62 N.E.2d 243 (1945).
50. City of Des Moines v. Barnes, 238 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W.2d 170 (1947).
51. Wilhelm v. City of Defiance, 59 Ohio St. 56, 50 N.E. 18 (1898); Hilyer v. City of
East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772, 776 (1951).
52. City of Keokuk v. Independent District of Keokuk, 53 Iowa 352, 5 N.W. 503

(1880).

53. St. Louis v. Connecticut Mutual Ins. Co., 107 Mo. 92, 17 S.W. 637 (1891);
Seattle v. Shorrock, 100 wash 234, 170 P. 590 (1918).

SHIFTING OF TORT LOSS
which the courts accept as the sole obligation of the present defendant. 54 And
the rule finds additional illustration in the cases denying municipalities
indemnity when the defendant is a governmental unit that would not have
been subject to suit or judgment in this type of action brought by the injured
party.

55

Indemnity should not be denied to a municipal corporation seeking to
recover against a co-tort-feasor solely to blame for the injury because the latter
has secured a covenant not to sue from the injured party in payment of a sum
of money.5 6 Where a municipal corporation is completely free of culpability
(as can be true in the vicarious liability cases) but has to pay a tort judgment,
it should be able to secure indemnification from its co-tort-feasor wholly to
blame for the delict. The fact that such a wrong-doer is not presently subject
to suit by the injured person because of his possession of a covenant not to
sue should not control its unjust enrichment obligation to the city.
The cases of vicarious municipal liability for the sole wrong of its cotort-feasor are the only situations justifiably giving the municipal corporation
indemnity or full recovery over against the co-tort-feasor. In no other tort
situation is it justifiable for a municipality that has breached its duty and
been held liable in tort to an injured person to impose upon a co-tortfeasor the
obligation to pay the entire judgment. It must be understood that the substantive municipal corporation law makes a municipality liable in the street
and sidewalk cases only after it has had notice, actual or constructive, of the
existence of the defect and ample opportunity to remedy it. Such a tortfeasor,
it is suggested, is not deserving of shifting its entire loss to a co-tortfeasor. The
pari delicto qualification only denies recovery to the tortfeasing municipality
when its fault is equal to that of the co-tortfeasor, but so long as the municipal
corporation is "only" 49% to blame, the courts are giving indemnity. That
contribution might be a worthy solution is hardly justification for the all-ornothing extreme of indemnity. Disturbed by their traditional unwillingness to
give contribution among co-tort-feasors the courts are driven to the most primitive of all loss shifts regardless of comparative culpabilities. If a court can
measure culpability and conclude that the city was only 49% liable so as to
make inapplicable the pari delicto rule, presumably it can ascertain the division
of fault between the co-tort-feasors so as to divide loss on the basis of comparative culpability in contribution. There is no principle of justice that permits a
culpable municipality under a theory of unjust enrichment to place the full
tort judgment upon its co-tort-feasor even though the latter might be somewhat
more at fault than the city, and the traditional judicial remedy of indemnification in these cases is as unjust as it is extreme.
54. Miranda v. City of Galveston, 98 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Tex. 1951).
55.

Incorporated Town of Norwalk v. Warren County, 210 Iowa 1262, 232 N.W.

682 (1930).
56. Cf. Bello v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. l05, 138 N.E. 526 (1922).
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RECOVERY OvR By MUNicIPAL CoRPoRATIoNS AGAINST TnmI
FEASORS (2) By CONTRIBUTION

Co-ToRT-

The majority of American jurisdictions at the common law refuse contribution to joint tort-feasors and the rule is applicable to municipal corporations. So, when a person was killed because of the breach of duty by a municipality to keep its streets safe and a similar breach of duty by a street railway, and
the city paid a judgment to the survivor, the Kentucky Court denied the
municipality contribution against the street railway company. The rationale and
language of that Court is typical of the majority rule jurisdictions. The Court
states:
"It is an anomalous if not unprecedented thing for a litigant, who is
a confessed wrongdoer, to come into court and set up the fact that its
own wrongful act, concurring with that of another, has destroyed
human life, and ask the courts to adjust the equities between it and
the other wrongdoer. .

.

.we have a plaintiff in court, who has con-

fessedly violated a duty which it owes to the public, asking that
same public through its courts, to compel another to share with it
the loss is has sustained on account of such violation, because the
other was equally remiss in its duty to the public in an entirely
different way, when their separate violations of public duty concurred
to bring about the injury for which it has been held liable ....

they

were each equally remiss in the performance of their duties to the
public. That being true, when either appeals to the public, through
its courts, for redress against the other, it will be denied, and they
will be left where they are found. ''aT
Under the traditional rule denying contribution, a municipal tort-feasor unable
to secure indemnity because of being in pari delicto, is completely unable to
share its tort loss with the co-tort-feasor who might be, and often is, fully as
liable for the injury. There is no convincing evidence that the majority rule
discourages negligent torts, and the antipathy of our society to unjust enrichment militates in favor of permitting the tort-feasor who has paid the entire
judgment to receive some recompense from the co-tort-feasor if the other is at
all culpable.
Contrary to the weight of authority contribution at common law is allowed
tort-feasors in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Tennessee, Maine, Minnesota and the
District of Columbia and, although there are no reported cases involving
recoveries by municipal corporations in all these jurisdictions, it seems clear
that municipalities can under some circumstances at least secure contribution
from their co-tort-feasors in all these jurisdictions. In some of the above, statutes
now authorize contribution. Previous to the adoption of the New York statute,
a court there in effect allowed contribution to a municipal corporation. Where
57.
So also:
(1934);
Bennell,

City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry. Co., 156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771, 775 (1913).
Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School District, 1 Cal. 2d 331, 34 P.2d 994
City of Denison v. Sanford, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 662, 21 S.W. 784 (1893); Tacoma v.
65 Wash. 505 (1911).
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a city and a building owner had been liable in tort and the owner's insurance
carrier paid the full tort judgment, the city was given an injunction to
prevent the insurance company from suing the municipality, the court ruling
that the city and the owner of the building were liable each for half of the
judgment.5 8 And some other courts allowed recovery at the common law to
municipal corporations when they were able to conclude that, for some reason,
the city and the other wrong-doer were not joint tort-feasors. For example, where
a city was held liable in tort for a fall on a sidewalk where the owner of the
building had placed a grating in the walk with the consent of the city, the
Georgia Court gave the municipality contribution, after ruling that the city and
the owner were not joint tortfeasors. Said this Court: "There was nothing
whatever to show any concert of action between the two in the wrong which
caused (the pedestrian's) injuries, such as is necessary to constitute them
joint tort-feasors." 59 Very similarly, where a woman fell on a sidewalk the
Michigan Court observed: "The parties were not joint tortfeasors. There was
a separate duty imposed upon both with respect to the same thing, but it was
a separate duty imposed on each, and not joint. The neglect was likewise the
separate neglect of each, and not the joint neglect of both." 0° Such rulings are
possible because of the inability of torts scholars and the courts to agree upon
a definition of the "joint tort-feasor", but most courts that have looked upon
the city-property owner's breach of duty to the pedestrian have characterized
them as joint tort-feasors.
Contribution between tort-feasors is given at Roman law,"' French law,6 Swiss law,6 3 Dutch law, 64 and German law65 and the basis of shifting the

tort loss is unjust enrichment of the co-tort-feasor who has gained by the
other's payment of the judgment.
Admiralty has long given the right of contribution to municipal corporaations, as well as others, against joint tort-feasors. Thus, where a city was
held for damage to cables placed in the water by its contractor it was permitted
to collect contribution from the negligent contractor who had failed to bury
them."6
Legislatures in many states have been cognizant of the injustice of the
common law rule denying contribution and have by statute permitted contribution against joint tort-feasors. The original Uniform Contribution among
58. City of White Plains v. Ellis, 113 Misc. 5, 184 N.Y.S. 444 (1920).
59. Schneider v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 610, 45 S.E. 459 (1903).
60. City of Detroit v. Chaffee, 70 Mich. 80, 37 N.W. 882, 886 (18SS).
61. Van Zyl Steyn, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors, 43 S.A-..J. 251 (1926).
But compare Cohn, infra note 62 at 492-3.
62. Cohn, Responsibility of Joint Wrongdoers in Continental Laws, 51 L.Q. Rev.
468, 494-5 (1935).
63. Federal Code of Obligations, Art. 50.
64. Preiss & Jahn, Contribution Between Joint Wrongdoers, 65 S.A.L.J. 582, 585
(1948).
65. Cohn, Responsibility of Joint Wrongdoers in Continental Laws, 51 L.Q. Rev.
468 (1935).
66. The Wonder, 79 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1935).
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Tort-feasors Act (1939) was adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and South Dakota, and the
1955 revision has been adopted in North Dakota. 67 Clearly, in all these
jurisdictions municipal corporations can recover contribution against their joint
tort-feasors, although there are not in all the states decisions involving municipalities. A number of other states have by statute, other than the Uniform Act,
changed the common law rule denying contribution. Municipal corporations,
like others, can now under statutory authority secure contribution against
certain joint tort-feasors at least in Virginia, New Jersey, Kentucky, Georgia,
Texas, North Carolina, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Kansas
and West Virginia.s Illustrative of municipal recoveries under the statutes,
when a Texas city and county together operated a hospital where a patient
was injured they were decreed joint tort-feasors and the court recognized recov00
erv over in contribution by one wrong-doer paying the whole tort judgment.
This nicely illustrates the propriety of dividing loss among tort-feasors both liable
for the injury, and it points up the injustice of the majority common law rule
that would make the city or the county absorb the entire loss depending upon
the whim of the injured person. And, under the New York statute, where a
rider in a vehicle was hurt as a result of a depression in a highway and sued
the county, the county was able to secure contribution from the construction
company which had created the dangerous condition. 0 Under the New York
act the right to contribution is not defeated because the present defendant has
settled with the injured party. 7' Under the New Jersey act a court of that
state has ruled that the statute does not apply between a municipal corporation that has paid a tort judgment and its co-tort-feasor where the latter is the
employer of the injured worker. 72 The court reasoned that the obligations of
the employer to the worker under the State Workmen's Compensation Act
were intended by the legislature to be the sole measure of the employer's
obligation arising from the injury. This is a legislative interpretatiorn that is
likely in all states having contribution statutes. As was previously noted in
the case of indemnity suits, absent contractual coverage, contribution is
ordinarily denied where the original tort-feasee now has no right of action in
tort against the defendant presently sued by the municipal corporation. Under
the North Carolina statute where the municipal corporation is the only party
67.' Uniform Laws Annotated (1958 Supp.) Vol. 9.
68. Georgia Code Annotated, § 105-2012; General Statutes of Kansas (1949). § 603437; Kentucky Revised Statutes, § 412.030; Michigan Statutes Annotated, § 27.1683;
Mississippi Code of 1942, § 335.5; Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes, § 537.060; New
Jersey Statutes Annotated, § 2A-53A-1 ff., New York Civil Practice Act § 211a; North
Carolina General Statutes, § 1-240; Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, § 2212; Code of Virginia, § 8-627; West Virginia Code Annotated (1955) § 5482.
69. Smith v. City of Dallas, 78 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), reversed on other
grounds, 107 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935).
70. Fletcher v. County of Broome, 286 App. Div. 286, 143 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1955).
71. Blauvelt v. Nyack, 141 Misc. 730, 252 N.Y.S. 746 (1931).
72. Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 NJ. Super 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).
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defendant in the original suit and the other tortfeasor is not properly brought
before the court in that action, the municipality must in order to secure contribution prove the negligence of its alleged joint tort-feasor, and recovery is
denied if this cannot be shown by the city.73 This, too, is a result that is
probable under all contribution statutes where the municipality does not bring
the alleged joint tort-feasor into court in the first suit. By the language of a
number of the statutes a municipal corporation will be unable to secure contribution if it is an intentional tort-feasor or if the tort committed by both
involves moral turpitude.74
Under veritably all of the American contribution statutes one tort-feasor
is given half of the amount of the judgment from the co-tort-feasor and, if
there are multiple tort-feasors, the sharing is on an equal basis. This result is
only justifiable if all co-tort-feasors are ever equally culpable or, possibly, if
the triers of fact cannot ascertain the extent of comparative culpability. The
first suggestion is so obviously unthinkable that it can be summarily rejected.
Secondly, the record is impressive that triers of fact can successfully ascertain
comparative culpability of persons involved in a tort. The experience of the
American jurisdictions employing the doctrine of comparative negligence
illustrates this well. 75 Furthermore, proportionate contribution between tort77
76
feasors has for many years been successful in England, Canada, France,
78
9
0
Switzerland,
Germany and the Netherlands." The English Law Reform
Act of 1935 provides: "In any proceeding for contribution under this section
the amount of contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may
be found by the court to be just and equitable, having regard to the extent
of that person's responsibility for the damage .
,s"81
English triers of fact
have been able to effectively apportion damages among co-tort-feasors. To
73. City of Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N.C. 106, 25 S.E.2d 407 (1943).
74. Code of Virginia, § 8-627: "contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced when
the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude"; same, Kentucky
Revised Statutes, § 412.030.
75. On the Wisconsin experience, see Note, 26 Marq. L. Rev. 151 (1942). Unfortunately, the Wisconsin Court has held its doctrine of comparative negligence does not
authorize a comparative culpability rule in contribution. Walker v. Kroger Grocery &
Banking Co, 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
76. The English Law Reform Act of 1935 has been re-enacted in Alberta and Manitoba, the 1936 Alberta c. 22; 1939 Manitoba c. 75. Ontario has slightly reworded the
English Act, as follows: '.Where damages have been caused or contributed to by the fault
of neglect of two or more persons the court shall determine the degree in which each
of such persons is at fault or negligent, they shall be jointly and severally liable to the
person suffering loss or damages for such fault or negligence, but as between themselves,
in the absence of any contract express or implied, each shall be liable to make contribution
and indemnify each other in the degree in which they are respectively found to be at fault
or negligent."
77. Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law 241 (1895); Cohn, Responsibility
of Joint Wrongdoers in Continental Laws, 51 L.Q. Rev. 468, 496 (1935).
78. Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, Art. 50; Cohn, supra Note 77 at 497.
79. Cohn, supra Note 77 at 497.
80. Preiss & Jahn, Contribution between Joint Wrongdoers, 65 S.A.L.J. 582, 585
(1948).
81. 25 & 26 Gee. V, c. 30, § 6.
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illustrate, where an elderly lady fell into a hole in a sidewalk and sued the coal
merchants delivering coal and the owner of the residence because the servant
of the owner had directed an employee of the merchant to raise an iron plate
in the walk and both had failed to fence or otherwise guard the aperture, the
English court found for the plaintiff in damages to the extent of eight hundred
pounds and then apportioned damages among them as follows: one-tenth
against the home owner and nine-tenths against the coal merchant.8 2 Again,
in a suit against a county hospital the English court apportioned damages
among the co-tort-feasors.8 3 There is no reason apparent why American tribunals
would have greater difficulty. This, then, is the just and practical way to
shift tort loss between municipal corporations and their co-tortfeasors. To
give a municipality full indemnity in most cases is fully as unjust as to deny
it all recovery when the city and the co-tort-feasor were equally at fault.
Statutes must be passed giving contribution to co-tort-feasors and providing
for comparative culpability proportioning of damages.
REcovERY OVER By Co-ToRT-Fr.SOxs AGAINST MUNIcIPAL ColPORATIONS (1)

By

INDEMNITY

Just as municipal corporations are able to recover against their fellow
wrongdoers in indemnity, so too, their co-tort-feasors can recover against
municipalities under the general rules governing indemnity. To illustrate, where
a contractor with a city pursuant to directions from municipal officials began
work for a bridge upon private property and the owners secured a judgment
for trespass against both the contractor and the city, which the contractor paid,
he was given indemnity against the municipal corporation. Said the Iowa Court:
"Where one is employed or directed to do an act not manifestly wrong, the law
implies a promise of indemnity by the principal for damage resulting proximately from good faith execution of the agency." This is a rule generally
recognized in all states. The Court said of the private contractor: "While as
between himself and the owner of the property, he was a trespasser, and liable
as such, as between the city and himself he was but acting in fulfillment of his
contract and under the direction of the properly constituted authority of an
officer of the city." The Court ruled that the contractor's agreement with the
city to indemnify the latter against the former's torts would not be construed
to relieve the city of its obligation to procure the necessary right of way for
the construction. In the contractor and agency cases the Iowa Court suggests
that recovery against the municipality will be given only for "an act not
84
manifestly wrong" and committed in "the good-faith execution of the agency."
The same Court on another occasion granted indemnification against a municipal
corporation when the city was excavating on private land and caused the
82.

Daniel and Rickett Cockerell & Co. and Raymond, 2 K.B. 322, 159 L.T. 311

(1938).
83. Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council & Another, 1 All English Rep. 633 (1947).
84. Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988, 989-990 (1924).
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adjacent street to collapse, destroying the right of access of another property
owner who recovered in tort from the owner of the land whereon the excavation
was taking place. The Iowa Court reasoned that the liability of the tort-feasor
paying the judgment was secondary while that of the municipality was primary.
Said the Court: "The trial court held the two defendants, though equally liable
to the plaintiffs, were not equally guilty and that their relative guilt may be
determined for the purpose for administering justice between them."8 5 Clearly,
as the case well illustrates, the shifting of tort loss between wrong-doers is
posited upon comparative culpability. In another reported case where because
of the fault of the city in digging, gas escaped froni a utility's pipes into a
house and the utility had to pay for the damage of a resulting explosion, the
utility was given indemnity by the New York Court against the municipality
primarily responsible for the damage.8 6
As seen in the earlier section, parties will be denied indemnity when they
are in pari delicto with their co-tort-feasors. Thus, where a workman employed
by a contractor acting for a municipal corporation was injured and recovered
from the contractor, when the contractor sought indemnity from the city
the Washington Court indicated that if the contractor was innocent of the
defective plans to which the injury was attributable and unknowing of their
inadequacy he would on remand be able to secure indemnity, but added that
if the contractor "knew of the danger and assumed the risk (he) could not
recover from the city, because both the city and plaintiff, both knowing of the
87
danger, would be in par delicto."
Under the rule that a co-tort-feasor only "passively" negligent can recover
from one "actively" negligent, followed in New York and some other states,
an "actively" negligent municipal corporation will have to respond in indemnity
to its co-tortfeasor who has been only "passively" negligent and paid the
judgment. Thus, after the Interborough Rapid Transit Company paid a
judgment for the death of a pedestrian who fell through an emergency door
in a sidewalk, opened by the Transit Company upon signal from a city worker
and at the request of the city surveyor, the Company recovered indemnity
from the city when the court labelled the city "actively" negligent and the
transit company "passively" negligent.88 These labels have little guidance value
to court, counsel or parties and are but a clumsy way of indicating that the
city appeared to be at more fault than the company. And the question must
be asked here, and all the indemnity cases, whether justice is done by completely absolving the tort-feasing transit company from the consequences of
its negligence and casting the full obligation upon the city. It would seem that
85. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228, 233 (1953).
86. Carroll v. City of Dunkirk, 234 N.Y. 579, 138 N.E. 454 (1922).
87. Aberdeen Construction Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 84 Wash. 429, 165 P. 1058, 1060
(1917).
88. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. City of New York, 237 App. Div. 612, 262
N.Y.S. 388 (1933).
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contribution with comparative culpability apportionment would be a far more
equitable distribution of the tort judgment loss.
Under other traditional language of the American courts, a co-tort-feasor
with a municipal corporation will be denied indemnity from the city when the
former's liability is described as "primary." Illustratively, where a city sent
a contractor to demolish and old structure leased from the city by the Boy
Scouts and there was a disregard of procedures necessary to protect the youths
with resultant injury and tort judgment against the parties, the contractor was
denied indemnity against the municipal corporation when the court concluded
that the "primary cause was the negligence of (the contractor's) foreman"
and ruled that "the plaintiff cannot require the defendant to indicate the con80
tractor's estate against responsibility for that negligence of his own employee."
A Wisconsin statute now provides that any private party causing defects in the
highways or other public grounds shall be "primarily" liable 0 with the result
under the general rule above that the municipality will not have to respond to
such a co-tort-feasor in indemnity. 9'
At the common law indemnity suits against municipal corporations by
their co-tort-feasors are few, probably because the governmental tort immunity
of the municipality is a defense not only to the direct tort action by the injured
person but also to an indemnity action by a co-tort-feasor where the munici92
pality's delict was in a "governmental" activity.
Statutes have added to the indemnity obligations of municipal corporations. A Wisconsin statute provides that municipal corporations shall pay any
judgment which is obtained against any officer or employee who was sued in
his official capacity and who had been proceeding in good faith. 93 An Illinois
statute decrees that cities over five hundred thousand population shall indemnify
policemen for any judgment recovered against them as a result of injuries
inflicted in the performance of their duties as policemen and without the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, except in cases of wilful misconduct on
the part of the policemen. Under the act the duty of the city to indemnify
is conditioned upon notice to it by the policeman of the service of process
against him. A city exposed to this statutory procedure has the right to intervene
in the suit and to defend the action. 94 The constitutionality of the act has
been sustained, the court noting that the liability of the policeman to the
injured person remains the same as before.9 5 In the leading case under the act,
a Chicago policeman had permanently blinded a citizen who then recovered
89. Devlin v. School District of Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 209, 10 A.2d 408, 410 (1940).
90. Wisconsin Statutes 1953, § 81.17. It makes the municipal corporation liable to
the injured party to the extent he cannot collect on execution from the wrongdoer.
91. Weir v. Hipke, 271 Wis. 140, 72 N.W.2d 717 (1955).
92. Incorporated Town of Norwalk v. Warren County, 210 Iowa" 1262, 232 N.W.
682; Devlin v. School District of Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 209, 10 A.2d 408 (1940).
93. Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, § 270.58; Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d
378, 99 N.W.2d 119 (1959).
94. Illinois Rev. Statutes, 1949, c. 24, § 1-15.
95. Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 III. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617 (1952).
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judgment against the officer, who had given notice of the suit to the city.
When the judgment was unsatisfied, the injured party brought a declaratory
judgment action against the city and the policeman. The court ruled that
notice of the suit to the city was conclusive as against it on the matter of
the patrolman's liability to the injured person, the plaintiff's lack of contributory negligence and the amount of damages, but since the first suit had
not litigated whether the patrolman was in the line of duty or whether he was
guilty of wilful misconduct, the city could now litigate these questions before
being held to the statutory indemnity. 96 The New Mexico statute in effect
provides for an indemnification by removing the liability of the municipal
worker and replacing it with a municipal liability so that the city now responds
directly.97 Repealing the tort liability of the municipal servant will likely not
discourage him from aiding in the defense of the suit by his city since the
factor of continued employment probably will ensure his co-operation in the
defense of the litigation. It is highly unlikely that the withdrawal of tort
responsibility will precipitate undue negligent behaviour by the worker. In
avoiding the second or indemnity action there is much to be said for such a
statute. The Ohio statute provides for the liability of municipal corporations for
injuries caused by the negligence of their employees and agents engaged in operating motor vehicles on the streets, but adding that the municipality is not liable
for the negligence of members of the police department "engaged in police duties,"
or members of the fire department at a fire, or proceeding either to a fire or an
emergency alarm. The act then removes the liability of firemen and policemen,
the former while "in the performance of governmental functions," and the
latter "while responding to an emergency call." 98 Indemnification to the
worker is by such a statute repudiated in favor of withdrawing suit by the
injured person against the public servant. Conceivably, to the extent that a
policeman or fireman is still liable in tort because he carried out lawful orders
in "non-governmental" or "non-emergency" situations he should, and will,
be entitled to indemnification from his employer municipality if he is not in
pan delicto. 99 Additionally, there are permissive statutes which allow municipal
corporations to indemnify certain public servants who have been exposed to
tort judgments while in the line of duty. Thus, a Michigan statute now permits
any political subdivision to indemnify a policeman for any judgment obtained
against him for injuries resulting from the line of duty, except where the conduct
was wilful misconduct, and provided that the offi6er serve the city with a copy
of the summons or process. 100 This type of statute at least makes clear that
96. Karas v. Snell, 11 Il. 2d 233, 142 N.E.2d 46 (1957).
97. New Mexico Statutes Annotated (1953) 14-17-11; Brown v. Village of Deming,
56 N.M. 302, 243 P.2d 609 (1953); Taylor v. Roswell, 48 N.M. 209, 147 P.2d 814 (1944);
Boca v. Albuquerque, 19 N.M. 472, 145 P. 110 (1914).
98. Ohio Revised Code, § 701.02.
99. Cf. McDermott v. Erwin, 148 Ohio St. 67, 73 N.E.2d 86 (1947); Rankin v.
Sanders, 96 Ohio App. 40, 121 N.E.2d 91 (1953).
100. Michigan Statutes Annotated, § 5.3376(1).
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power is now in the municipal corporation and probably will influence the courts
to find that such expenditures are valid under the "public purpose" limitation.
REcovERY OVER By TORT-FEASos AGAINST MUNICIPAL CpmoRTONS (2)
BY CONTRIBUTION

Contribution by a co-tort-feasor against a municipal corporation is possible
at the common law in the few American jurisdictions noted earlier that permit
such recovery over between tort-feasors. Illustratively, when a city having the
duty to trim trees failed to and an accident ensued between a locomotive and
the driver of a car, a federal court in Wisconsin recognized under the law of
1
that state that the railroad could recover in contribution from the city. 00o
However, as noted earlier in the matter of indemnification, there are few
reported common law recoveries against municipalities, probably because of
the relatively few minority rule jurisdictions and perhaps the greater reason that
municipalities are generally immune from tort liability in all their "governmental" affairs. Thus, a third-party action by a bus company against the
District of Columbia was dismissed by the court because the police car
involved in the accident was engaged in a "governmental" function.' The same
immunity exists under the statutory contribution provisions.
In the earlier-indicated jurisdictions having statutes permitting contribution
between tort-feasors, municipalities engaged in "proprietary" activities will
have to respond in contribution to their co-tort-feasors who have paid the tort
judgment. To illustrate, where a city negligently failed to warn of a dividing
plot in the center of a street, a truck driver who had to respond in tort for an
injury to a third person was given under the Maryland act contribution from
the city in the amount of one-half of the judgment. 2 Because most of the
statutes are limited to contribution between "joint tort-feasors" statutory contribution against a municipal corporation is in these states denied when the
court concludes the municipal wrong-doer was not a joint tort-feasor with its
fellow culpable. Here, too, the disparate and unfortunate interpretations of
the term will often negate the claims of justice. Thus, when a contractor
erecting the Empire State Building constructed a sidewalk shed to protect
pedestrians, he was unable to secure contribution from the city even though
the city had the duty to keep safe the sidewalk and had, according to the
plaintiff's allegations, expressly required the shed to be erect with supporting
posts placed on sills over one of which the pedestrian tripped. The New York
Court concluded "that the City was not in the position of a joint tort-feasor
with respect to other allegations of negligence and nuisance in the complaint,
such as the inadequacy of light and the failure to erect or maintain warning
signs or other marks indicating the presence of the sill and the omission to
1oa. Bosin v. Minneapolis etc. R.R., 183 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
1.
2.

Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 225 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
East Coast Freight Co. v. Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58 A.2d 290 (1948).
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place guard rails or ropes about it." Where two tort-feasors have an identical
duty to the same injured party, and either's fulfilment of its duty would
have prevented the injury, it is of doubtful propriety to refuse contribution,
in a state where it has been authorized by the legislature, simply because the
co-tort-feasors breached their duties in somewhat different ways.
Where what the courts call "primary liability" is in the private tort-feasor,
such as a contractor, rather than the municipal corporation, the former, een
under the contribution statutes is likely to be denied even partial recovery
over against the municipality. The existence of "primary liability" is found
at times by the courts from the greater fault of the municipality's co-tort-feasor,
and at other times from contractual agreements protecting the city from its
contractor's delicts. Thus, in a suit for contribution under the Missouri statute,
where a telephone company and the city had both been liable for injuries
incurred when the original plaintiff fell into a depression around a newly sunk
telephone pole, the court denied contribution to the company when it concluded that it was primarily liable, both by reason of greater culpability and
because of a bond providing that the company would save the city harmless. 4
Again, the same Court denied contribution under the statute to a contractor
who was excavating for a municipality when they both had been held liable
for the subsidence of another party's land. Here the Court concluded that
the terms of the contract made the party primarily liable and that the
agreement of the company to indemnify for its own personal participation in
an affirmative act of negligence was not against public policy even when the
city was also liable for "the mere omission of a legal duty."5 There is additional
evidence from New York that under its contribution statute the courts are
continuing to deny contribution to a party from a municipal corporation when
the former is more blameworthy than the city.6 So long as the kind of contribution authorized by the statutes is limited to an even division of the tort
judgment, courts are probably going to be reluctant even in these statutory
states to give a co-tort-feasor recovery over to the extent of fifty percent of the
judgment when it was in the eyes of the court fifty-five percent to blame for
the injury and the city only forty-five percent. The obvious, and just, answer
is to redraft the contribution statutes so as to enable the courts to give contribution on the basis of comparative culpability, as the courts in England,
Canada.and a number of other countries are doing.
The Maryland contribution statute is interpreted to deny a tort-feasor
contribution against a municipal corporation when the injured person was a
municipal worker who had been paid workmen's compensation by the city.
Said the Maryland Court: ".... the act is only applicable to a situation where
there is a common liability to an injured person in tort. Such liability may
3.
4.
5.
6.

West v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 524, 525, 12 N.E.2d 458 (1937).
Kinloch Tel. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 188 S.V. 182 (1916).
Hemon Const. Co. v. St. Louis, 256 Mo. 332, 165 S.W. 1032 (1914).
Bonadonna v. City of Buffalo, 156 Misc. 225, 281 N.Y.S. 343 (1935).
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be joint or several, but there can be no contribution where the injured person
has no right of action against the third party defendant." 7 This can be
anticipated in contribution suits against municipal corporations elsewhere,
as it is the majority position on this point.8 It accords with the general rule that
there can be no contribution where the injured person never had a right of
action against the third party defendant.
SETTLEMENTS
Traditionally, a release of one joint tort-feasor releases all, so that if a
municipal wrongdoer secures a release its effect will be to free the co-tort-feasor
from tort judgment and, if the co-tort-feasor first secures a release the municipal
corporation cannot be held for the same injury. Illustratively, a release of the
party responsible for an unsafe walk was held to discharge the municipal
corporation, the Ohio Court reasoning that this result had to follow in justice
since the city had lost its right to indemnification. 9 "Any other rule," says the
same Court, "would be fraught with grave possibility of danger of injustice
to a city. If the real wrong-doer may settle for a nominal sum and leave the
injured party free to pursue the city and throw the entire burden upon the
city to make a defense of facts of which it had no knowledge or means of
knowledge but which lie within the sole knowledge of the wrongdoer, the
city would become an insurer. . ."10 However, there are jurisdictions in which
"partial releases" of one tort-feasor still permit the injured partly to recover
against the co-tort-feasor, and there are appearing holdings in these jurisdictions that an injured person who "partially releases" one joint tort-feasor from
liability to him does not thereby terminate the other tort-feasor's right to contribution." And, as observed earlier, the New York statute giving contribution
is interpreted so that the right to contribution is not defeated because the
12
wrong-doer sued for contribution had earlier settled with the injured party.
When either the municipal corporation or its co-tort-feasor settles with an
injured party and secures from the victim a covenant not to sue, the tortfeasee in most jurisdictions can reserve his right to sue the tort-feasor not
giving the covenant. 3 In such a case, when the co-tort-feasor is sued, the triers
of fact should be told to first determine the extent of the plaintiff's damages and
then deduct therefrom the amount he has already received from one of the
7. Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858, 860 (1944).
8. Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 31 N.J. Super 356, 105 A.2d 752
(1954). But, for New York, see Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Corp.,
278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938); for Pennsylvania, see Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14
A.2d 105 (1940); and for North Carolina, note, Lovette v. Floyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d
886 (1953).
9. Hilyer v. City of East Cleveland, 165 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1951).
10. Bello v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 105, 138 N.E. 526, 530 (1922).
11. Henry Fuel Co. v. Whitebread, 236 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
12. Blauvelt v. Nyack, 141 Misc. 730, 252 N.Y.S. 746 (1931).
13. Reinach v. City and County of San Francisco, 164 Cal. App. 2d 763, 331 P.2d
1006 (1958) ; City of Ft. Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan. 369, 252 P. 268 (1927).
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tort-feasors in payment for the covenant. If the settlement occurs during suit
when both wrong-doers had been .named defendants and there is no remainder,
the verdict should be in favor of both defendants. If there is a remainder, the
verdict should be entered in that amount against the non-settling tort-feasor,
although a New York court indicates that the verdict should be entered against
both the tort-feasors. 14 If the amount of the verdict does not exceed twice what
the city has paid, then the city having paid its share under the prevalent
contribution rule, should not be called upon to pay more. However, if the
amount of the excess is more than twice the amount paid by the city and the
co-tort-feasor pays this judgment, he is entitled to contribution from the city
to the extent that half of such judgment exceeds the amount paid by the city
for the covenant.15 The same principle prevails where the co-tort-feasor secures
a covenant not to sue. Either party securing such a covenant will have to
recognize that his contribution obligation, posited upon restitutionary principles
still remains to the co-tort-feasor who has to pay more than his share for the
injury inflicted by the negligence of both.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
It is generally possible for an injured person to name as defendants both
the municipal corporation and the co-tort-feasor where the injury was due to
the concurrent negligence of both.'0 At common law an injured person is not
required to name as defendants both the municipality and the other wrong-doer.
Under some contribution statutes, as in New York, if the injured party does
not elect in the first instance to join the several co-tort-feasors as co-defendants,
there is no right of one to implead the others and secure contribution. In these
states the right to contribution arises only after joint judgment has been
17
recovered against both of them and one has paid more than his share. Today
in most states, including New York, if the injured party does not name the
municipality's co-tort-feasor as a defendant, a municipal corporation seeking
indemnity can bring in the other wrong-doer, or the other tort-feasor named
8
defendant can implead the municipality, as an additional defendant.' At an
earlier date some cases denied this opportunity on the theory that the municipal
corporation originally named defendant had no right of action against its co14. Blauvelt v. Village of Nyack, 141 Misc. 730, 252 N.Y.S. 746 (1931).
15. Ibid.
16. Bosin v. Minneapolis etc. Ry., 183 F. Supp. 820 (El). Wis. 1960), East Coast
Freight Lines v. Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58 A.2d 290 (1948), City of Des Moines v. Barnes,
238 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W.2d 170 (1947).

17. Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co., 190 N.Y.2d 447, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
18. Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 225 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Great
A & P Tea Co. v. Boyles, 102 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1939); Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co., 5
N.Y.2d 447, 186 N.YS.2d 15 (1959); Reinach v. City and County of San Francisco, 164
Cal. App. 2d 763, 331 P.2d 1006 (1958); Mathews v. City of Pittsburgh, 394 Pa. 180, 146
A.2d 294 (1958); Fletcher v. County of Broome, 286 App. Div. 286, 143 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1955);
Lobelio v. City of New York, 268 App. Div. 880, 51 N.YS.2d 7, aff'd 294 N.Y. 816, 62 N.E.
2d 243 (1945); Bowman v. City of Greensboro, 190 N.C. 611, 130 S.E. 502 (1925).
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tort-feasor until the former had paid off the tort judgment.10 In many states
statutes permitting contribution allow the tort-feasor defendant to bring in
his co-tort-feasor. 20 Where all the tort-feasors are properly before the cohrt in
the original action, with adequate jurisdiction and service, the court's judgment
as to the liability of the tort-feasors is binding upon all the wrongdoers. 2' Under
modem statutes the court can in the original action resolve the indemnity and
22
contribution obligations between the co-tort-feasors.
If the injured party names as defendant only the municipal corporation,
and local practice does not permit impleading the co-tort-feasor or the municipality chooses not to, or cannot because of lack of personal jurisdiction, the
23
city can secure recovery over against its co-tort-feasor in an independent suit.
24
Although trespass has been resorted to in some of the earlier cases, the proper
restitutionary action is assumpsit. In the language of the Pennsylvania Court,
"with greater propriety assumpsit might have been used. The action is brought
to recover money paid by the plaintiff which should have been paid by the
defendant. The essence of the plaintiff's claim is the breach of an implied
contract of indemnity in its favor with the negligent property owner." 25 Equity
has also been used to give this type of restitution.2 6 In the older practice where
no notice of the original action is given to the co-tort-feasor, the municipal
corporation in its indemnity and contribution actions proves (a) the negligence
of the co-tort-feasor, (b) freedom from contributory negligence by the injured
party, (c) the causational nexus, (d) damages, (e) its payment of the judgment, and (f) the liability of the defendant to it because of unjust enrichment.
Similarly, where notice to the co-tort-feasor can be given under local law but
the municipality chooses not to, the omission to give notice does not go to the
right of action by the municipality, but simply changes the burden of proof,
and imposes upon the municipal corporation, against whom the original
judgment was recovered, the necessity of again litigating and establishing all
of the actionable facts.2 7 Such a municipality has to prove the liability of the
present defendant and the defendant can show that it has immunity from tort
liability.28 The co-tort-feasor can introduce any defense that he could have raised
if sued directly by the injured party. Similarly, where there was no previous
19. City of Georgetown v. Groff, 136 Ky. 666, 81 S.W. 518 (1910).
20. Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944).
21. East Coast Freight Lines v. Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58 A.2d 290 (1948); Kinloch
Tel. Co. v. St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 188 S.W. 182 (1916).
22. Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, 260.11.
23. City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee, 51 Cal. 2d 127,
330 P.2d 802 (1958); Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 N.Y. 550 (1884) ; Salt
Lake City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d (1945).
24. Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839); Philadelphia v.
Bergdoll, 252 Pa. 545, 47 A. 736 (1916); Ashley Borough v. Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 A.
442 (1911).
25. Philadelphia v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 133, 189-90, 145 A. 65, 67 (1929).
26. Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 488 (1924).
27. Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 N.Y. 550, 556 (1884).
28. City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N.Y. 67 (1878).
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litigation but a settlement or compromise was effectuated by the municipal
corporation, such a municipality now seeking indemnity or contribution will
have to show all the essential facts authorizing recovery by the injured party
against the present defendant, the obligation of the defendant to the present
plaintiff posited upon unjust enrichment, and the reasonableness of the
compromise. 29 Compromises made in good faith are to be deemed prima facie
correct. 30
Local practice often permits the municipality or the private wrong-doer
sued as tort-feasor to give notice to its co-tort-feasor with a demand to defend.
The procedure by which the tort-feasor defendant gives notice of the pendency
of the action and an opportunity to defend to the reputed co-tort-feasor alleged
to be liable over to him is at times described by the expression "vouching in." 31
If the co-tort-feasor fails to respond, so that a second suit by the municipality
or the private party is necessary, the municipality or the private party in the
second suit for indemnity or contribution will not have to prove (a) the
existence of the defect or other cause of injury or damage, (b) the original
plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence, (c) the liability of the
32
defendant in the first suit to the injured party, or (d) the amount of damages.
Typically, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
"As a deduction from the recognized right to recover over, it is
settled that where one having such a right is sued, the judgment
rendered against him is conclusive upon the person liable over provided notice be given to the
latter and full opportunity be afforded
33
him to defend the action."
At times the courts talk the language of estoppel against such a co-tort-feasor
who has received notice and refused to defend the original action. Thus, the
New York Court has said: "If the party who is ultimately responsible has
notice of the pendency of an action against his indemnitee and is given an
opportunity to defend, and neglects it, he is still bound by the result of the
action and estopped from controverting in an action subsequently brought
against him by such indemnitee, the facts which were litigated in the original
action.1 34 Similarly, the Illinois Court states: "The notice given in such cases
is not for the purpose of establishing a ground of action, but rather to estop
the other party from saying that the defendant in the first action was not
bound to pay the money. '35 It is not required that the party sued for indemnity
or contribution have had notice in writing of the principal suit unless specified
29. Consolidated Coach Co. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932).
30. Ibid.
31. Karas v. Snell, 11 Ill. 2d 233, 142 N.E.2d 46, 54 (1957).
32. Karas v. Snell, 11 III. 2d 233, 142 NE.2d 46 (1957); City of Des Moines v.
Barnes, 238 Iowa 1192, 30 N.W.2d 170 (1947); Philadelphia v. Reading Co., 295 Pa. 183,
145 A. 65 (1929); City of Ft. Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan. 369, 252 P. 268 (1927);
City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N.Y. 67 (1878).
33. Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 329 (1896).
34. Village of Port Jervis v. First Natl Bank, 96 N.Y. 550, 556 (1884).
35. Karas v. Snell, 11 Il. 2d 233, 142 N.E.2d 46, 55 (1957).
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by statute, and notice has been implied from his knowledge of the pendency
of the original action and by his participation in its defense.30
A number of modem statutes authorize notice by a municipal corporation and particularize the effect of such notice. Illustratively, the Iowa statute
provides:
"When any action is brought against a municipal corporation for
personal injuries alleged to have been caused by its negligence, said
municipal corporation may notify in writing any person or corporation by whose negligence it claims the injury was caused. Said notice
shall state the pendency of said action, the name of the plaintiff, the
name and location of the court where the action is pending, a brief
statement of the alleged facts from which the cause arose, that said
municipal corporation believes that the person or corporation so
notified is liable to it for any judgment rendered against said municipal corporation, and asking such person or corporation to appear
and defend. Thereupon, any judgment obtained in such suit shall be
conclusive in any action by the municipal corporation against any
person or corporation so notified, as to the existence of the defect or
other cause of the injury or damage, as to the liability of the municipal corporation to the plaintiff in the first named action in consequence
thereof, and as to the amount of the damage or injury occasioned
thereby; and every such municipal corporation is hereby empowered
to maintain an action against the person or corporation so notified to
recover the amount of any such judgment together with all3 0athe expenses incurred by such municipal corporation in such suit.

These statutes do not create the right of indemnity, which existed previously,
but spell out the effect of giving notice to the co-tort-feasor.3 Gb When the
original defendant sues for indemnity or contribution in a second case, the
prior case is conclusive only of matters necessarily included in the adjudication
and is not conclusive of the question of whether the person served with notice
is in such relation to the original defendant as to be bound. The burden is
still on the voucher to establish by aliunde proof his remedy over against the
vouchee. To illustrate, where a municipal corporation would not be liable to
indemnify a policeman if he was acting outside the scope of his duties or
wilfully, the policeman in the second-indemnity action has to prove that he
was acting not wilfully but in the performance of his duties, facts which were
not necessary to the adjudication in the original action holding the policeman
liable in tort.3 7 When a municipal corporation under practice such as described

recovers indemnity in the second suit, it is proper to include in the sum
recovered the costs to the city of defending the original action and its attorney
fees. 3 8 In contribution recovery such expenses should be divided in the proportion controlling division of the judgment or settlement.
36.
36a.
36b.
37.
38.

Village of Port Jervis v. First Natl. Bank, 96 N.Y. 550 (1884).
Iowa Code Annotated, § 368.34.
Franzen v. Dimock Gould & Co., - Iowa -, 101 N.W.2d 4 (1960).
Karas v. Snell, 11 Ill. 2d 233, 142 N.E.2d 46 (1957).
City of Ft. Scott v. Pen Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan. 369, 252 P. 268 (1937).
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Under proper restitutionary principles, the defendant being sued by a
tort-feasor for either indemnity or contribution has not been unjustly enriched
by the instant plaintiff until the latter has paid more than his share of a tort
obligation which in justice is the full or partial obligation of the present defendant. Accordingly, in actions to recover over, the statute of limitations (applicable
not to delicts, but to quasi-contracts) 3 9 should not begin running until that
time. The Texas Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, has ruled that, under
its practice where the original defendant can bring in his co-tort-feasor, the
statute of limitations in the indemnity action did not begin to run in favor
of the co-tort-feasor until the tort judgment was paid by the defendant named
in the original tort action. Said the Texas Court: "The pleadings showed that
the injury to the plaintiff happened more than two years before the filing of
the answer of the city impleading the asylum. The ruling was correct. No
limitation against the city ever commenced to run so long as it had no cause
of action, and a cause of action only arose in its favor when it sustained damage
from the act of the asylum." 40 And the Pennsylvania Court has ruled that
though an injury occurred on August 2, 1902 and a two-year limitation on
tort claims prevailed, where payment of the judgment by the named tort-feasor
municipality was made on May 23, 1906 it could recover over against its co-tortfeasor when this suit was begun on August 24, 1907.41 Similarly, it has been held
that a tort claim against the United States does not "accrue" within the
meaning of the applicable statute until the party seeking indemnity has paid
the injured person. 42 And the District of Columbia has recently been held liable
in contribution to a co-tort-feasor who paid the entire judgment when the
injured party could not have, either at the time of the contribution action or
at the time of the original tort suit, recovered against the District because the
short period of lihitations applicable to the government had run. 43 These
decisions contradict the oft assumed proposition that contribution or indemnity
does not lie if the defendant is not then liable to the injured party. Nevertheless, they are in accord with proper restitutionary principle recognizing the
cause of action for the first time upon payment of the other's obligation.
Furthermore, statutes giving contribution are being interpreted as not requiring
the existence at the time of the contribution claim of any right by the injured
party against the present defendant. Thus, the New Jersey Court states:
"The continued subsistence of the common liability is not a sine qua non to
enforcement of contribution under the statute.""1 According to this Court, it
is enough if the right of the injured party against the present defendant existed
at the time when the instant plaintiff paid the judgment which in justice should
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
(1954).

Ashley Borough v. Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 A. 442 (1911)..
City of San Antonio v. Talerico, 48 Tex. 151, 81 S.W. 518, 520 (1904).
Ashley Borough v. Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 A. 442 (1911).
Chicago etc. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939, 942 (7th Cir. 1955).
Keleket X-ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 102 A.2d 587, 595
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have been paid in whole or in part by the defendant. On the other hand, it is
veritably impossible to find unjust enrichment if the present defendant was
not legally liable to the injured party when the present plaintiff paid the
judgment.
The social policy favoring recompense by one who has been unjustly
enriched may clash with a legitimate social policy that encourages unitizing all
related litigation in one action and winding it up as early as possible. Therefore,
in those states with modem third party practice, the named defendant should
be encouraged to bring in his co-tort-feasors and at the earliest possible date.
To achieve this laudable result, it is advisable to begin running the period of
limitation in his indemnity or contribution claims from the first moment that
he could secure jurisdiction and service over his co-tort-feasors which will
usually be the date the named defendant receives copies of the pleadings from
the injured party. If the named defendant could not secure proper jurisdiction
or service over his co-tort-feasors the rule would not apply. Here, and in all
jurisdictions not permitting a named wrong-doer to bring in his co-tort-feasors,
the determination of whether a tort-feasor who has paid judgment can recover
over against his co-tort-feasor at a time when the latter could not be subject to
direct suit by the injured party must depend upon (1) legislative intent underlying recovery over, as in the contribution enactments, and (2) the strength of
the social policies basic to the different rules of law immunizing the wrong-doer
from tort responsibility. If the purpose of the statute of limitation is to outlaw
stale suits and force an injured party into court while the defendant's witnesses
are alive and available, this social policy is adequately protected if the original
plaintiff who has been injured begins his suit against one of the co-tort-feasors
within the prescribed time. The second social policy opposed to unjust enrichment would then require payment by the co-tort-feasor even though at that
moment the injured party could no longer sue the defendant now being held
to contribution or indemnity. However, there are other reasons why wrongdoers who were liable at the time of the delict may be immunized and the
social justifications for the immunity may well preclude contribution or
indemnity. Consider the situation where a surgeon and a charitable hospital
were both negligent and a person was seriously injured at a time when both
were-liable, but shortly thereafter the legislature exempted charitable hospitals
from tort responsibility. It may have been the intent of the legislature to free
the hospital not only from direct tort liability but also from the indirect cost
of contribution or indemnity. Or consider the situation where, after the delict
but before suit, one 6f the co-tortfeasors marries the injured party. It may
well be that the social policies making unpalatable interspousal litigation
militate in favor of a rule freeing the husband from both direct tort loss or
indirect indemnity or contribution, which conceivably might financially impoverish the couple and imperil the matrimonial bliss. Nevertheless, in permitting contribution by a third party tort-feasor against the tort-feasor who was
44
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the husband of the injured party at the time of contribution claim, but not at
the time of the delict, the New Jersey Court observed: "The considerations of
marital unity and domestic peace and felicity underlying the ancient policy
interdicting actions between spouses have no place here." 45 This Court seems
to feel that since there is no suit between spouses there is no affront to the
basic social policy. It might have considered whether a husband out-of-pocket
because of the injury to his wife would not only be less solvent, but less
amicable.
Given the incontestable social policy strongly favoring recovery over
against one unjustly enriched, it may be well, in the absence of highly persuasive and clearly identifiable social justifications against contribution or
indemnity in the particular cases, to adopt a rule to the effect that if the cotort-feasor sued for contribution or indemnity would have been subject by the
injured party at the time when judgment was paid for him by the other
wrong-doer recovery over is in order since at that moment the present defendant
was both liable and necessarily unjustly enriched. At any previous moment it is
impossible to find unjust enrichment. This is an intermediate position between
those who would allow recovery over if the present defendant was ever liable
to suit by the injured party and, at the other extreme, those who would deny
recovery over unless at the moment of the second suit recovery against such
defendant by the injured party was possible. There is some support in the
decisions for this position. Thus, in granting contribution against one who was
then the husband of the injured party (and accordingly then immune from
direct suit in the jurisdiction) but who had not yet been wed at the time the
present plaintiff paid the judgment to the girl, the New Jersey Court justified
recovery over in these words: "At the time of the satisfaction of the judgment,
in tort, there existed between the plaintiff and the defendant in this proceeding
the common liability in tort which is basic to the statutory right of contribution
46
as a means of equalizing the common burden.1
CONCLUSION
First, courts must be brought to a realization that contribution and
indemnity are but gradational differences of the same concept, that is, the
restitutionary understanding that one tort-feasor who shares fault with another
is unjustly enriched if the other is forced to pay the full judgment to the
injured person. Accordingly, the New York Court must be encouraged to
repudiate its notion that there is something significant distinguishing the two.
When it says "There is a fundamental ditinction between contribution and
indemnity. The right to contribution is not founded on nor does it arise from
contract and only ratable or proportional reimbursement is sought in an action
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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for contribution" 47 it is (a) but stating a truism without any import that
contribution shifts less than all the loss while indemnity shifts it all, and (b)
failing to comprehend that express contracts are no more necessary for
indemnity than for contribution. Indeed, counsel must make it clear to such
courts that contribution, fully as much as indemnity, can be based upon express
contract. The unfortunate apologetic of the typical court that regularly grants
indemnity and refuses contribution has attempted to create a "fundamental
distinction" where none exists.
Secondly, the courts in the common law states must be encouraged to see
that the unjust enrichment of the tort-feasor who is not sued by the injured
party demands quasi-contract payment to the other. They must be convinced
that contribution limited to negligent tort-feasors does not encourage anti-social
activity endangering others. Indeed, the good risk of escaping contribution under
the present common law might be a greater incentive to recklessness. If the
courts will not respond to the restitutionary demands against such a tort-feasor,
the legislatures must be encouraged to authorize contribution between tortfeasors.
Thirdly, in all common law and statutory states permitting contribution
the next step should be taken and contribution given on a comparative culpability basis. There is ample experience in the nations of the Western World
indicating that shifting of loss on the basis of comparative fault is practical.
Obviously the present contribution division on a pro rata basis finds little
justification in the realities of culpability.
Lastly, it is urged that contribution and indemnity practices and statutes
by amended where necessary so as to enable a party defendant in the original
tort action to bring in any additional co-tort-feasor over whom jurisdiction can
be had, and resolving in the one suit the liabilities of the tort-feasors as between
themselves. If the co-tort-feasor is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
state courts then, of course, the tort-feasor will have to seek his recovery over
in an independent action in a proper forum.
47. McFall v. Compagnie Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 327, 107 N.E.2d 463, 470 (1952),
followed in Putvin v. Buffalo Electric Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 186 N.Y..2d 15 (1959).

